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The Role of Fairness and Ambiguity in Negotiating Marketing Alliances
This paper provides empirical support for the positive effects of distributive, procedural and
interactional fairness on the choice to form a marketing alliance. Furthermore, the results provide
some support for the negative impact of ambiguity in respect to the partner's marketing
capabilities on the choice to form a marketing alliance.
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Introd uction
The need to create and foster partnerships in order to improve business performance is significant
and becoming increasingly important to businesses today. These partnerships, alliances and other
forms of collaborative working arrangements are now quite commonplace (Eden and Huxham
200 I). Parties may choose to collaborate for a variety of reasons, such as making a joint decision
about creating a marketing alliance between two brands, or perhaps creating a strategic joint
venture between two organisations. Strategic joint ventures are greatly increasing as firms deal
with global technological, financial and marketing challenges, creating strength and opportunity
through alliances (Rao and Schmidt 1998). Whatever the reason for collaborating, the parties will
make a decision as to whether or not they will form an alliance.
Creating an alliance is often a challenging ordeal, and there are a variety of factors that could
potentially influence the decision to form an alliance. Potential factors include business variables
such as market know-how and distribution capabilities to name just a few. Alternatively the
decision could be affected by emotional factors such as predispositions for a partner and
perceptions of trust. Thus, there is a variety of potential factors which may influence the
formation of a strategic alliance beyond the capabilities that are required to make an alliance
successful. For example, previous research by Arino and Ring (2004) found that negotiations
characterised by fairness and misunderstandings affect the formation of strategic alliances. Their
work, however, is case study based and lacks quantitative substantiation. The purpose of this
paper is to examine role of fairness and ambiguity in the negotiation of marketing alliances.
More specifically, we aim to understand better whether (a) ambiguity affects the decision to form
a marketing alliance, and (b) whether fairness influences that decision.
Negotiating Alliances
While there is distinct lack of research that addresses negotiations in alliances, the wider literature
provides some foundations. Bazerman (1998) argues that when two parties aim at reaching a joint
decision yet have different preferences, they negotiate to reach a mutually agreeable outcome.
The literature on negotiation styles and associated negotiation behaviour provides several
conceptual frameworks of negotiation behaviour. For example, Thomas and Kilmann (1987)
assume that negotiation styles are independent of a particular context, thus that individual
negotiation behaviours can be assessed across situations. Accordingly, negotiation styles are
relatively stable behaviours that arise in negotiation encounters. They are patterns in individuals'
behaviour that reappear in negotiation situations through the mechanism of predisposition toward
particular courses of conduct (Gilkey and Greenhalgh 1986). On the other hand, Hall (1969)
argues that negotiation behaviour is influenced by the situation, Rahim (1983) by the target, and
Putnam and Wilson (1982) by both the situational context and the target.
The literature states numerous negotiation styles and related behaviours. For example, Putnam
and Wilson (1982) identify three negotiation styles-control, solution-oriented and non-
confrontation modes. These three negotiation styles are sim ilar to those identified by authors such
Mnookin et al (2000) and Weider-Hatfield (1988). Other authors specify five negotiation styles-
integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding and compromising (Rahim 1983) or collaborating,
compromising, competing, accommodating and avoiding (Thomas and Kilmann (1987). Common
among those and the various other typologies are two distinct styles: the integrative and
distributive styles. An integrative negotiation style is linked to a problem-solving orientation in
which trust, affinity, and joint gain are emphasised, whereas the distributive negotiation style is
linked to a competitive orientation in which power, and individual gain are stressed. In this paper
we lean on the dual-concerns model and the works of Allred (2000), Rahim and Magner (1995) and
Thomas (1992) and focus the following four facets of negotiation behaviour-avoiding,
accommodating, collaborative, and competitive. The underlying assumption is that parties displaying
a behaviour that is characterised as collaborative would more likely to agree when negotiating an
alliance than those being competitive (Pruitt 1981; Lewicki et al. 1986; Bazerman 1998). The
negotiation literature falls, however, short of explaining how ambiguity or fairness may affect
whether or not parties will form a an alliance.
Ambiguity
Ambiguity has been addressed only implicitly in the alliance context by Arino and Ring (2004).
In the wider literature, Ellsberg describes ambiguity as being present in situations where the
available information is barely sufficient or obviously unreliable and highly conflicting (Ellsberg
1961). Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) note that there is a difference between ambiguity, ignorance
and risk. These differences can be distinguished according to the degree to which one can rule out
alternatives; that is, ambiguity is an intermediate state between ignorance (no alternatives can be
ruled out) and risk (all but one alternative is ruled out) (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985).
According to March and Simon (1967), and Epstein (1999), ambiguity and risk differ in relation
to the known probabilities of likely events. It is argued that risk relates to situations where the
perceived likelihood of events can be represented by probabilities which are fixed and objective,
such as tossing a coin or rolling dice (March and Simon 1967; Epstein 1999). On the other hand
ambiguity, also referred to as uncertainty, relates to situations where the information available is
too imprecise to be summarised by a probability measure (March and Simon 1967; Epstein 1999).
The advantage of studying ambiguity instead of risk is that it assesses uncertainty in the real-
world, and it is not limited to games of chance and stated probabilities. Thus ambiguity is present
in negotiation scenarios where the decision maker cannot determine the probability of their
opponent's actions or the probability that an agreement will be achieved.
Drawing upon various definitions of ambiguity we define it as it applies to the present study.
Throughout this research ambiguity will be synonymous with uncertainty. Ambiguity relates to
the doubtfulness, uncertainty or vagueness within the decision maker when deciding on a possible
alternative. Ambiguity is present when choosing an alternative in which the probability of the
outcome of that alternative is too complex to be calculated. Ambiguous information is that which
is misleading, incomplete or prevents the decision maker from determining the true state of that
information. There can be ambiguity in situations where the negotiator does not have sufficient
information to make a rational decision. Drawing on the aforementioned definitions of ambiguity,
we argue that judgement and decision making is affected by perception of ambiguity.
Social Judgement Theory (SJT), developed by Austrian born psychologist Egon Brunswick
(Cooksey 1996; Goldstein 2004), in negotiations explains that the nature of human judgement
itself is a source of conflict and that disagreements often flow from the judgement process (Balke,
Hammond and Meyer 1973). SJT has been employed to examine labour-management
negotiations, and in particular how it can be used to explain conflict between negotiators (Balke
et al. 1973). Human judgement is described to be highly subjective, inaccurate and at times
inconsistent which may lead to conflict between negotiators (Balke et al. 1973). A source of
disagreement lies in the differing weights that they attach to the elements of a labour contract
(Balke et al. 1973). Therefore SJT provides a possible explanation for how negotiators deal with
ambiguity, which may cause parties to disagree on a possible collaboration. SJT is a theoretical
framework which may explain how negotiators perceive information in alliance formation
contexts which are laden with ambiguity, particularly information about the opposing party's
capabilities or the capabilities of oneself. By distorting the truth about capabilities it is possible
that individuals may choose not to venture into an alliance. Although there have been no
empirical studies which investigate explicitly this possible phenomenon, SJT may be a theoretical
foundation for the understanding the role of ambiguity in the stage of alliance formation.
Fairness
Research on justice theory and its relationship to negotiations and collaborations emphasises the
importance of fairness in negotiations. According to Bazerman (1998), handling fairness aspects
appropriately affects negotiations, in general, and in alliance, in particular(Arino and Ring 2004).
The latter authors stress the role of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness in and the
effect of these in emerging collaborative ventures.
Distributive justice refers to an individual's perceptions of fairness in relation to the allocation of
the available rewards/resources amongst group members (Chan 2000; Arino and Ring 2004;
Welsh 2004). When negotiating an agreement, disputes often take place over how the resources
will be allocated. For example, when negotiating an international joint venture, there are many
distribution factors which can be disagreed on which may lead to disputes and the possible
termination of an agreement. Arino and Ring (2004) study this occurrence through a case study of
a negotiated international joint venture between two pharmaceutical companies, one Argentinean
and the other Spanish. These two companies disagreed on factors relating to the distribution of
ownership control, financial contributions and human resource contributions. Furthermore neither
party was prepared to move from their starting positions. The negotiations failed because the
parties felt that the opposing party was acting unfairly in regards to ensuring that the benefits
received to both parties would be proportional to the contributions made (Arino and Ring 2004).
This shows that perceptions of distributive fairness during the negotiation process can have a
significant impact on whether two parties are willing to collaborate or not.
Procedural justice relates to an individual's perception of the methods, mechanisms and
procedures used to arrive at a decision, and the extent to which they believe these procedures or
processes are fair or unfair (Greenberg 1990b; Greenberg 1990a; Chan 2000; Tyler 2000; Welsh
2004). Procedural fairness is argued to have a greater impact on negotiation outcomes than
distributive fairness (Barling and Phillips 1992). Unjust procedures have been shown to create
negative consequences such as lower performance, higher turnover, less commitment and
negative behaviour (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). It is well established that perceptions of
fairness of the decision making process have a significant impact on the reactions and motives of
individuals after a decision has been made (Tyler 1986; Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza
1995; Chan 2000; Tyler 2000; Welsh 2004).
Guth and co-authors have shown that procedural fairness plays an important role in the outcome
of two-player ultimatum games, which can be paralleled to the ultimatum scenarios created
within two-party non-equity alliances (Borges and Knetsch 1997). Furthermore, parties have been
shown to reject profitable negotiation offers when they believe that the distribution of resources is
unfair or unequal, in essence punishing their opportunistic partner for not sharing the resources
equally (Borges and Knetsch 1997). Also, when procedural fairness is perceived to be strong,
parties are more likely to accept an agreement and commit to the decision, even when a party felt
that the outcome of the decision was unfair (Eden and Ackerman 200 I). This illustrates that if
negotiators use the correct procedures and protocol during a negotiation then the final result is
more likely to be adhered to, even if it favours one party more than the other. Commitment to an
agreement will fail when the negotiators begin to break away from the required or expected rules
and procedures of the negotiation.
The literature on fairness does not empirically investigate whether perceptions of procedural
fairness will jeopardise the likelihood of coming to an agreement, thus it would be beneficial to
measure the effect of procedural justice on the choice to form an alliance as a separate factor to
distributive and interactional justice.
Interactional justice refers to the way in which people treat each other whilst carrying out
procedures, or the fairness between the' interactions' accorded to one another (Chan 2000; Arino
and Ring 2004). Interactional fairness consists of two components; interpersonal sensitivity and
social accounts (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). According to Folger and co-author (1998),
interpersonal treatment refers to fair treatment and politeness, whereas social accounts provide a
rationale for undesirable outcomes to the recipients. These elements of interactional fairness
include levels of conflict, poor attitudes, poor performances, tone of voice and levels of respect.
These factors could potentially weaken negotiations if allowed to escalate out of control. Other
research has stated that interactional fairness is a combination of the perceived fairness of how
decision makers implement procedures and the extent to which decision makers convey an image
of themselves as being a fair person (Greenberg 1990b; Greenberg 1990a; Tyler and Bies 1990).
High levels of interactional unfairness will most likely result in parties not wanting to collaborate,
because unfavourable first-encounters during the negotiation phase may be indicative of a
negative relationship in the future if an agreement is made. Parties will most likely exit the
negotiation either through being offended or simply not wanting to risk committing to a
relationship prone to conflict. Relationships are an integral aspect of any working collaboration,
and it has been shown that higher levels of interactional fairness are positively related to higher
levels of success in relationships between employees and also between managers and employees
(Lamertz 2002).
Arino and Ring (2004) illustrated the effect which interactional fairness can have on the outcomes
of negotiated alliances in their previously mentioned case study of the two international
pharmaceutical companies. They found that letters of communication which were written in a
negative tone had an impact on the desire of the opposing party to collaborate. Furthermore, the
parties became absorbed in resolving a number of interpersonal conflict matters and other issues
of interactional fairness which resulted in delaying the collaboration, which greatly effect the time
taken to reach an agreement. If parties are fighting over small matters of conflict then they are
unable to focus on more important issues in the negotiation, such as the distribution of resources.
This may jeopardise collaboration amongst firms.
There has been significantly less research on interactional fairness than distributive and
procedural fairness, and quite often interactional fairness is explicitly viewed by authors as an
aspect of procedural fairness rather than an independent concept (Greenberg 1990b; Cropanzano
and Greenberg 1997). Barling and co-author (1992) found that in cases where interactional justice
was not mentioned in the research, the results of procedural justice outcomes may have been
confounded by the effects of interactional justice which, in some cases, may be stronger than the
expected effect of procedural fairness.
A Model of Alliance Negotiation accounting for Fairness and Ambiguity
The proposed model suggests that the choice to collaborate in an alliance is affected by both
ambiguity and fairness. Taking a utility maximisation perspective in accordance to random utility
theory (eg, Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000), the choice to form an alliance will depend largely
on the utility derived from a potential alliance offer. Ambiguity and fairness are likely to affect
the perceived utility associated with an alliance and, thus, the choice to form an alliance or not.
We argue that ambiguity will have a negative impact on the perceived utility of a possible
alliance. Within the context of marketing alliances, ambiguity can be synthesised as a restricted
view of the opposing alliance party's marketing capabilities which they bring to the collaboration.
By not being able to accurately judge the opposing party's marketing capabilities it is posited that
the decision maker will be averse to forming an alliance of such a magnitude. The ambiguous
state will make it difficult for an individual to form a rational judgement about the opposing party
and, in accordance to RUT, decrease the value of the utility function that defines the importance
of the marketing capability factors to the overall utility of the alliance being offered. The contrast
to an ambiguous state is a clear state, whereby the marketing capabilities of the potential partner
are fully understood and do not hinder the decision making ability of the individual. In this
unambiguous state the decision maker will have access to adequate information to be able to
make a rational judgement and form utility functions for the marketing capabilities presented to
them. Thus, ambiguity is likely to have a negative relationship with alliance formation. Thus we
posit that;
HI: Increasing levels of ambiguity will decrease the perceived utility of an alliance and the
likelihood offorming an alliance.
We suggest that fairness has a positive impact on alliance formation, with increasing perceptions
of fairness consequently increasing utility perceptions and the decision to collaborate. Fairness, in
its three forms, increases utility perceptions. Perceptions of distributive, procedural and
interactional fairness can affect an individual's willingness to collaborate. Furthermore, the
motivation for forming an alliance can be hindered by feelings of injustice or ill treatment. Thus,
we posit that distributive, procedural and interactional justice have a positive relationship with
alliance formation. Increasing levels of fairness will likely result in an increased perception of
alliance utility and an increased willingness to form an alliance. Conversely low levels of fairness
(i.e. high levels of injustice) will possibly lead to a decreased utility perception of the proposed
alliance; hence, leading to a decreased desire to form the particular alliance. Thus we posit that;
H2: Increased levels of distributive fairness will increase the perceived utility of an alliance and
the likelihood offorming an alliance.
He Increased levels of procedural fairness will increase the perceived utility of an alliance and
the likelihood of forming an alliance.
H4: Increased levels of interactional fairness will increase the perceived utility of an alliance and
the likelihood offorming an alliance.
Em pirical Study
The empirical study reported in this paper employs an experimental design utilising a discrete
choice analysis of data from business students in the fourth year of undergraduate studies and
MBA students in Australia. This method was chosen in order to systematically examine the
effects of ambiguity and fairness using a convenience sample of individuals with a suitable
background; with 200 respondents completing this experimental study.
Experimental Design
The experimental design was devised in order to test all possible main effects of the fairness
attributes and ambiguity levels as well as levels of marketing capabilities; the latter was included
to control for the effects resultant from the level of capabilities underlying the strategic rationale
for forming a marketing alliance. The three fairness attributes (distributive, procedural and
interactional) were designed in binary levels of True or False (depicting either Fair or Unfair).
The marketing capabilities attribute took on four possible levels which describe the level of
competence the opposing party has in regard to their marketing capabilities. These levels were
labelled Insufficient, Average, Good and Superior in ascending order. Finally, ambiguity was
measured on two levels as either Ambiguous or Clear, both depicting the state of clarity with
which the marketing capabilities are communicated. With four attributes of two levels and one
attribute of 4 levels the design would be 24 x 4, giving 64 possible alternatives. These alternatives
were duplicated in order to increase the number of data points which would be obtained, giving a
total of 128 choice sets. Considering 128 choice sets or even 64 choice sets is an arduous task for
respondents to complete, the design was split into 8 blocks containing 16 choice sets in each
block. The 8 blocks were then administered randomly to the respondents, to ensure that the
complete data set had been tested adequately.
Instrument and Scenario
The context of the choice experiment involved two hypothetical sweets manufacturers in the
AustralianlNew Zealand food industry. The respondent was assigned the responsibility of
marketing manager for one organisation, who was to decide whether or not to collaborate with the
other organisation to enter the New Zealand sweets market. The respondent was informed of the
importance of the combined marketing capabilities of the two organisations in order for the
alliance to be successful. The respondent was then asked to complete the choice survey by
indicating which alliance option they preferred out of two options, and whether they would agree
to form an alliance based on the preferred option in that scenario.
Marketing Capabilities: It was important to include marketing capabilities in the choice scenario
for a number of reasons. Firstly it provides an adequate basis to embed the alliance scenario, on
the premise that an alliance should be formed upon evaluation of a potential partner's marketing
capabilities. Even though measuring marketing capabilities was not the focus of our research
hypotheses, it provided an avenue for us simulate the affect of ambiguity so that it may be
measured in accordance to the aforementioned research hypotheses. Inclusion of marketing
capabilities alongside fairness factors also provided an alternative decision rule for alliance
selection other than the fairness factors. Simulating ambiguity via the marketing capabilities
enabled us to test its effect on preferences without the respondent being aware of its effect. The
effect of ambiguity on alliance preferences can be derived by testing aversion to high variances in
marketing capabilities, and it is posited that higher variances will lead to a reduced likelihood of
collaboration. The marketing capabilities were conveyed via four statements which were derived
from a measurement scale originally developed by Atuahene-Gima (Atuahene-Gima 1993).
Ambiguity: Ambiguity was measured by varying the levels of the separate components of the
overall marketing capabilities so that the respondent would not have a clear indication of the overall
value of the marketing capabilities. The variance of the marketing capabilities item for each
scenario option was calculated to reflect the ambiguity associated with the marketing capabilities.
For an option that had no ambiguity (i.e. all of the items were identical in value) the variance would
be zero. Conversely, an alliance option with high ambiguity (i.e. all of the items in the option were
different) has a variance of four (the mean would be 2.5, and the total variance from the mean is 4).
The results were analysed to determine whether the respondents have an aversion to higher
variances, which infers that they have an aversion to higher levels of ambiguity.
Fairness: The fairness components were measured using three separate attributes and associated
statements. The distributive fairness statements were adapted from a scale originally developed
by Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995). The procedural fairness statements were adapted from
a measure originally developed by Lamertz (Lamertz 2002). The interactional fairness statements
were adapted from a measure originally developed by Lamertz (2002). The three fairness
attributes (distributive, procedural and interactional) comprising 4 statements each were
articulated as binary levels depicting either Fair or Unfair (True or False).
Covariates: A set of demographics as well as the respondents' negotiation style, namely
avoiding, accommodating, competitive and collaborative, was measured to exarnme
possibly confounding effects. The styles were measured using the scales developed by
Gudergan and co-authors (2004).
Results and Remarks
Tables I to 5 summarise the results of the analyses carried out to examine the hypotheses
developed in this paper. Overall, they provide support for the hypothesised effects. Thus, fairness
and ambiguity influence the decision to form an alliance. In conclusion, this paper extends the
work of Arino and Ring (2004) by providing a theoretical foundation for the role of ambiguity in
the negotiation of alliances and additional quantitative empirical findings supporting the
hypothesised effects. Further empirical research is recommended to provide additional support.
Table 1
Choose B and Collaborate
B S.E. Wald Sig. A+B
Option A ADistFair 0.345 0.111 9.717 0.002 DistFair -1.634
AProcedFair 0.272 0.106 6.602 0.010 ProcedFair -1.238
A InteractFair 0.523 0.110 22.577 0.000 InteractFair -0786
ACapability -0.182 0.048 14.596 0000 Capability 0.343
AAmbiguity -0.065 0.113 0332 0565 Ambiguity -0.763
Option B BDistFair -1.979 0.121 268.243 0000
BProcedFair -1.510 0.113 180.126 0000
BlnteractFair -1.309 0.117 124.986 0000
BCapability 0.525 0.050 111.399 0.000
BAmbiguity -0.698 0.116 36.352 0.000
Style Avoiding -0.409 0.221 3.440 0.064
Accomodating 0.724 0.225 10.373 000 I
Collaborative 0.482 0.218 4878 0.027
Competitive -0.217 0.233 0.868 0.352
Constant -0.643 0.317 4.120 0.042
Ta ble 2
Choose B and Collaborate
B SE Wald Sig.
Option A ADistFair 0.356 0.111 10.267 0.001 DistFair -1.632
AProced Fair 0.267 0.106 6304 0.012 ProcedFair -1.249
A In teractFair 0.524 0.110 22.548 0000 InteractFair -0.778
ACapability -0.181 0.048 14.362 0000 Capability 0.352
AAmbiguity -0.060 o 113 0.285 0.594 Ambiguity -0764
Option B BDistFair -1988 0.121 268.381 0000
BProcedFair -1515 0.113 179.756 0000
B InleractFair -1.303 0.118 122.867 0.000
BCapability 0.533 0.050 113.410 0.000
BAmbiguity -0.704 o 116 36711 0000
Style Avoiding -0.390 0.222 3074 0.080
Accomodating 0.722 0.227 10 143 0.00 I
Collaborative 0.551 0.226 5.932 0015
Competitive -0.338 0.272 1.541 0215
AGE 0.087 o 125 0.487 0.485
GENDER 0.008 0.022 0.118 0.731
MANAGER 0.067 o 105 0.405 0.525
MANAGYRS 0.790 0.433 3.330 0.068
ALLIANCE -0.370 0.144 6.640 0.010
ALL YRS -0.520 0.904 0.330 0.565
Constant -0.875 0.614 2.030 0.154
Table 3
Choose B and Collaborate Excluding Avoiding and Collaborative
B S.E. Wald Sig.
0.352 0.111 10.072 0.002
0.261 0.106 6.060 0.014
0.517 0.110 22.067 0.000
-0.189 0.048 15.689 0.000
-0.057 0.113 0.256 0.613
-1.993 0.121270.820 0.000
-1.517 0.113 180.768 0.000
-1.305 0.117 123.517 0.000
0.531 0.050 113. I74 0.000
-0.697 0.116 36.200 0.000
0.646 0.224 8327 0.004
-0.244 0.269 0.825 0.364
0.096 O.I24 0.603 0.437
0.001 0.022 0.003 0.955
0.056 0.105 0.282 0.595
0.949 0.429 4.902 0.027
-0.387 0.144 7.252 0.007
-0.486 0.897 0.293 0.588
































B S.E. Wald Sig.
Option A ADistFair I. I 87 0.094 159587 0.000 DistFair 0.067
AProcedFair 1.175 0.093 159.900 0.000 ProcedFair 0419
AlnteractFair 0.787 0.089 77.424 0000 InteractFair 0.054
ACapability -0.547 0040 184.846 0.000 Capability 0.205
AAmbiguity 0.133 0.090 2.181 0.140 Ambiguity -0083
Option B BDistFair -I. 120 0.091 152.584 0.000
BProcedFair -0.756 0.088 74158 0.000
BlnteractFair -0.733 0.090 65.673 0000
BCapability 0.752 0.042 318.195 0.000
BAmbiguity -0215 0.093 5.375 0.020
Style Avoiding 0.101 o 186 0.294 0588
Accomodating -0004 0.187 0.001 0.982
Collaborative 0.242 0.190 1.626 0.202
Competitive -0414 0.227 3.319 0.068
AGE 0.004 0.104 0001 0.972
GENDER 0004 0.019 0.051 0.821
MANAGER 0.048 0.089 0.296 0586
MANAGYRS 0256 0.341 0566 0452
ALLIANCE -0084 0.104 0.661 0416
ALL YRS -0.585 0.657 0.792 0373
Constant -0.776719 0.511237 2.308254 0.128689
Table 5
Choose B Excluding Avoiding and Collaborative
B SE. Wald Sig.
Option A ADistFair 1.184 0.094 159053 0.000 DistFair 0.062
AProcedFair 1.177 0.093 160409 0000 ProcedFair 0.420
AlnteractFair 0.783 0.089 76.833 0.000 InteractFair 0.049
ACapability -0.549 0.040 186.556 0.000 Capability 0.202
AAmbiguity 0.133 0.090 2.179 0.140 Ambiguity -0082
Option B BDistFair -1.122 0.091 153234 0.000
BProcedFair -0.757 0.088 74.324 0000
B1nteractFair -0.734 0.090 65.959 0.000
BCapability 0.751 0.042 317.729 0.000
BAmbiguity -0.214 0.093 5.323 0.021
Style Accomodating -0.003 0.185 0.000 0.988
Com petitive -0423 0.226 3514 0.061
AGE 0.001 0.104 0.000 0.990
GENDER 0.002 0.018 0014 0.907
MANAGER 0.042 0.088 0.222 0.637
MANAGYRS 0.316 0337 0881 0.348
ALLIANCE -0092 0.104 0.788 0.375
ALLYRS -0479 0.651 0.541 0.462
Constant -0.522 0.473 1220 0.269
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